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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELDON L. ANDERSON, dba 
SILVER DOLLAR LOUNGE, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, YUKUS Y. 
INOUYE, KARL R. LYMAN, 
and KENNETH J. PINEGAR 
as Commissioners, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 15653 
-~~~TION FOR REHEARING AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
.'CJ'~ POINTS OF AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND TO THE ASSOCIATE 
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
COME NOW the respondents in error, within twenty days 
after the decision in the above-entitled case which this 
Honorable Court rendered, vacating the judgment of the trial 
Court, and respectfully submits this, Petition for Rehearing, 
pursuant to and in accordance with Rule 76(e)(l) of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure and for cause thereof shows: 
1. That this Court has overlooked and failed to apply 
its own decision in Shaw v. Orem City, 117 Utah 288 (1950), 
1 
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which holds that the legislature intended the sale of light 
beer to be regulated solely by the State Liquor Commission 
and local authorities and further that a beer license con-
stitutes no property interest but is merely a privilege con-
ferred upon the licensee and subject to denial without 
affording due process. This has become a maxim of law ad-
hered to by this Court and the District Court throughout the 
years. 
2. That this Court has impliedly held Sections 32-4-8 
and 32-4-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, unconstitutional. 
Without further clarification and specific treatment given by 
this Court to these issues, the state of the law will remain 
uncertain. 
3. That the opinion of this Court and the authorities 
cited therein has created considerable question procedurally 
as to whether or not this Court actually intended to vacate 
the District Court's decision without remand or whether it 
intended to vacate and remand for additional findings of fact. 
By simply vacating without remand, the Court has taken away 
the rights of Utah County to enforce health, fire, and zoning 
laws so far as they apply to the appellant in this case. The 
health and welfare of many residents of Utah County cannot 
now be protected by the County because this Court has apparent~ 
removed the County's right so to do. 
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4. Utah County contends that although not required, 
due process was afforded the appellant in this case, and re-
quests this Honorable Court to remand for further findings 
not inconsistent with the Court's ruling in favor of Utah 
County. 
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that a rehearing be granted, 
that the judgment of this Court heretofore entered on January 
4, 1979, be vacated; that the judgment of the trial Court be 
affirmed, and that the opinion of this Court be modified to 
agree with the provisions of law and controlling authorities 
set out in this Petition for Rehearing and in the accompanying 
Brief of Authorities. In the alternative, this Court should 
at least remand for further findings or hearing to the trial 
Cour~~etermine whether or not the appellant was afforded 
due process as claimed by petitioner. 
Respectfully submitted this 2..f"- day of s.J8nulJ.ty ' 1979. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
and correct copy of I hereby certify that I mailed a true 
Petition for Rehearing to Matt Biljanic, Attorney for Appellant, 
7355 South 9th East, Midvale, 
this z.F day of ., 2iJ./!" 'iV"f 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A "CLASS B" BEER LICENSE IS NOT A "PROPERTY" 
RIGHT AND NOT SUBJECT TO DUE PROCESS PROTECTION. 
It is well settled that licenses issued for 
the sale of intoxicating liquors or beverages have 
no quality of a contract or of property, but are 
merely temporary permits to do what otherwise 
would be an offense against the law - that such a 
license is a mere privilege to carry on a business 
subject to the will of the grantor, and is not a 
contract between the licensee and the government, 
or property or vested right. 2 A.L.R.2d 1239 
Section 3 at Page 1244. 
32-4-8 U.C.A., 1953, reads as follows: 
The Commission, without or without a hearing, 
may at its discretion refuse to grant any license 
or permit applied for, and may revoke any license 
or permit at any time; and in no such case need any 
cause be stated. The acts of the Commission in 
giving or withholding consent or in granting, denying, 
or revoking licenses or permits shall not be subject 
to any review whatever, except in the cases in which 
such action has been procured by fraud. If at any 
time a licensee or permittee shall cease to possess 
all of the qualifications required by this act it 
shall be the duty of the Commission to revoke his 
license or permit. All licenses and permits shall 
have incorporated therein the statement that they 
are granted subject to revocation as provided in 
this act. 
This same power has been delegated to city and county 
commissions as a result of Section 32-4-17, cited Infra. 
See Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake City, 51 p.2d 
645 (Utah). 
In Shaw v. Orem City, 117 Utah 288 (1950), the Supreme 
4 
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Court ruled that the Legislature intended that the sale 
of light beer be regulated solely by the State Liquor Com-
mission and local authorities. The Court indicated that a 
beer license constitutes no property interest but is merely 
a privilege conferred upon the licensee and subject, at the 
will of the grantor, to denial without affording due process. 
The Court relied on 46-0-131 U.C.A., 1943, (re-enacted 
as 32-4-17 U.C.A., 1953) which reads in part as follows: 
Cities and towns within their corporate 
limits, and counties outside of incorporated 
cities and towns shall have power to license, 
tax, regulate or prohibit the sale of light 
beer, at retail, in bottles or draft .... 
[emphasis added.]. 
In writing for the majority, Justice McDonough stated: 
That the state may prohibit 
int~~ting liquors is too well 
require\\citation of authority. 
* * * 
the sale of 
settled to 
The power conferred is to 'license, tax, re~ulate 
or prohibit' the sale of light beer at retail ... 
It seems to us patent that since a city may proh1b1t, 
it may elect not to prohibit but to perm~t, un~er 
such conditions or restrictions as the discretion 
of its governing authority may dictate, subject, 
of course, to conformity with state law. 214 P.2d 
at 890. 
At Page 807 of the Northwest Reporter, Second Series, 
the Iowa Supreme Court in Smith v. Iowa Liguor Control Com-
mission, 169 N.W.2d 803 (Iowa 1969), stated: 
5 
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The right of a legislature to provide, without 
notice or hearing, for revocation of licenses, or 
permits for the sale of beer is so well established 
that it seems hardly debatable. Constitutional 
questions of due process and taking of property without 
compensation have been repeatedly answered by the 
statement that a license to . . . sell . . . beer, 
... is a privilege granted by the state and is in 
no~~ property right. Such a license doe"S"""not 
constitute a contract with the state or with the 
municipality or other governing body which the state 
empowers to issue it. When the licensee takes this 
privilege, he does so subject to the provisions of 
the statutes under which it is granted; and that 
these statutes say or fairly imply that he is en-
titled to no notice or hearing before revocation, 
he cannot be heard to complain if he is given none. 
[emphasis added.] 
In disposing of the petitioners' contention that a beer 
license constitutes a property right protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Court in Smith, supra, continued: 
[W]hen a business is inherently illegal a 
permit to operate may be granted or refused at the 
will of the licensing body, is a privilege rather 
than a property right, and may be revoked without 
notice or hearing. 169 N.W.2d at 807. 
For additional authority on point see Central States 
Theatre Corporation v. Sar, 66 N.W.2d 450 (Iowa); State ex. 
rel. Garrett v. Randall, 527 S.W.2d 366 (Missouri 1975); 
Plumb v. Christie, 30 S.E. 759 (Georgia 1898); Tammaro v. 
Bruckman, 18 N.Y.S.2d 689 (New York 1939). 
POINT II 
A FORMER HOLDER OF A LIQUOR LICENSE 
IS NOT ENTITLED TO A PREFERENCE OVER 
NEW APPLICANTS WHEN PETITIONING FOR A 
LIQUOR LICENSE RENEWAL. 
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This Court, in the majority opinion handed down in 
the case at bar, cited Charles D. Kaier Co. v. Doran, 42 
F.2d 923 (E.D. Pennsylvania 1930), as authority for the 
proposition that administrative discretion in refusing the 
renewal of a liquor license is not so broad as in refusing 
an application made for the first time. At Page 2 of the 
opinion, Justice Crockett, writing for the majority, stated, 
"There are respected authorities which affirm the proposition 
that the administrative body (the County Commission here) 
should not have the same breadth of discretion in refusing 
the renewal of the license of an operating business as it 
would in passing on an application for the establishment of 
a new business." Th'e opinion of the Court as expressed by 
Justice,'frockett appears to be contrary to the great weight 
of auth~ty as expressed in 45 Am. Jur.2d, Intoxicating 
Liquors, Section 175, wherein it reads: 
Proceedings for the renewal or reissuance of 
a liquor license are governed by the same rules 
which would apply if the application were made for 
the first time. That is, the same discretion as 
that vested in the licensing authorities with 
respect to the original granting of a liquor license 
exists with reference to renewals. 
This view as expressed by Am. Jur. above, has been sub-
stantiated by numerous respected authorities. See Quitt v. 
Stone, 39 F.2d 219 (DC Md. 1930), affirmed 46 F.2d 405 
(CA4th 1931); Paron v. Shakopee, 32 N.W.2d 603 (Minnesota 1948 ); 
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Zicherman v. Driscoll, 45 A.2d 630 (N.J. 1946), and Res-
taurants and Patisseries Longchamps v. O'Connell, 68 N.Y.S.2d 
298 (1947), aff'd without opinion 296 N.Y. 888 (1947). There 
appears to be no authority (outside Pennsylvania) for the 
proposition that one who applies for renewal of a license is 
in favored position over one who applies for initial license. 
In Howard v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 508 P.2d 
819 (Or. App. 1973), the Liquor Control Commission (Commission) 
denied petitioner's application for the renewal of a Class C 
Retail Malt Beverage License for a tavern. The petitioner 
cited Charles D. Kaier Company v. Doran, supra, and argued 
that his application was entitled to preferential treatment 
as a renewal. The Commission relied on ORS 471.301(1) which 
reads in part as follows: 
A license granted by the Liquor Control Act shall: 
* * * 
(c) be renewable in the manner provided in ORS 
471.290 except for a cause which would be grounds for 
refusal to issue such license under ORS 471.295 ... 
In addition 471.290(1) states: 
Any person desiring a license or renewal of a 
license shall make application to the County Commis-
sion .... No license shall be granted or renewed 
until the provisions of the Liquor Control Act and 
the regulations of the Commission have been complied 
with. 
In Howard, supra, the Court rejected the petitioner's 
8 
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argument and ruled that Charles D. Kaier Company v. Doran, 
supra, would fail, even if good law, "because of the express 
language of the above statutes." 508 P.2d at 820. At the 
time Kaier v. Doran, supra, was decided there appeared to be 
no Pennsylvania statute similar to ORS 471.290. 
In the instant case, it is the contention of the peti-
tioner (County Commission) that Charles D. Kaier Company v. 
Doran, supra, as cited by the majority in their decision is 
inapplicable, as it was in the Oregon case, because of the 
express language of 32-4-8 U.C.A. (1953), cited earlier. 
Although Section 32-4-8 fails to expressly concern it-
self with liquor license renewals, the Utah statute is un-
argua'b~ broad enough to include liquor license renewals. 
32-4-8 p~vides that the Commission may "at its discretion" 
...._,. 
refuse to grant "any license" at "any time" without cause. 
The above-cited enabling statute is clearly void of any 
legislative intent which would lead one to believe that per-
sons petitioning for liquor license renewals are to be given 
preferential treatment over new applicants. In fact, the 
intent of the Legislature, from the fact of the statute, is 
surely contrary to any such interpretation. See also ~ 
v. Wayne, 135 N.W. 457 (Michigan, 1911). 
In addition, in the instant case the majority opinion 
suggests that principles of "reasonableness and justice" 
9 
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require the County Commission to afford special consideration 
to petitioners for liquor license renewals when, "one reflects 
on the practicalities of the situation where the business has 
been established and operating for some years and thus re-
presents a substantial commitment in the time, effort and 
expense by the owner." U.2d , (No. 15653, January 4, 
1979), at Page 2. The law is well settled that the appellant 
is charged with constructive knowledge as to the contents 
of Section 32-4-8 and is presumed to realize that any renewal 
is based solely on the discretion of the license granting 
authority. The fact that the retail liquor industry is heavily 
regulated and that a Class B beer license must be renewed yearly, 
are clear indications that the Class B beer retailer volun-
tarily assumes a risk that the license may be revoked or a 
renewal application refused regardless of cause. To hold 
otherwise would allow the retailer to plead ignorance of the 
law as a defense to any license revocation or renewal denial. 
The expectancy of maintaining a licensed status beyond current 
license term is not properly within the meaning of Article 
1, Section 7 of our Constitution. A licensee is not justified 
in making investments dependent on renewals. 
POINT I II 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THIS COURT FINDS 
10 
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THAT A CLASS B BEER LICENSE CONSTITUTES 
A PROPERTY INTEREST REQUIRING DUE PROCESS 
PROTECTION, THE COURT SHOULD REMAND THE CASE 
FOR ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT RATHER THAN 
TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT. 
Tha language used; the format employed; and the authority 
cited in the majority opinion in the instant case, has 
created considerable question as to whether or not this Court 
actually intended to vacate the District Court's decision 
without remand or whether or not it intended to vacate and 
remand for additional findings of fact. At Page 2 of the 
majority opinion the Court stated: 
We agree with the plaintiff's contention that 
the foregoing are not really 'findings of fact' but 
are simply recitals of procedure and do not constitute 
f1:ings, as required by Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P., which 
pr wides: 
In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury ... ' the court shall find 
the facts specially and state separately 
its conclusions of law thereon .... 
[emphasis added.] 
It is true that we indulge the presumption of 
regularity in the proceedings before the trial court. 
But this does not suffice when the record itself 
exposes essential deficiencies. With certain excep-
tions, not applicable here, the just-quoted rule must 
be complied with and a judgment cannot stand unless 
there are findings which will justify it. 1 
The failure of the trial court to enter adequate 
findings requires that the judgment be vacated. In so 
ruling, it is appropriate that we make some observa~ . 
tions regarding the plaintiff's claim that the Commission 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously.2 Silver Dollar Lounge 
v. Utah County Board of County Commissioners, U.2d 
, (No. 15653, January 4, 1979). 
11 
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Footnote 1 of the instant case cites LeGrand Johnson 
Corporation v. Peterson, 18 U.2d 260, 420 P.2d 615 (1966) 
and cases therein cited. Footnote 2 reads as follows: 
That it is our duty to pass on matters which 
may become material when a case is remanded for 
further proceedings, see Rule 76(a), U.R.C.P.; 
LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, supra, note 1. 
Silver Dollar Lounge v. Utah County Board of County 
Commissioners, U.2d , (No. 15653, January 4, 
1979). 
The Court cited the following language but failed to 
remand the instant case. Nevertheless the Court proceeded 
to pass upon and determine questions of law necessary to 
adjudicate the matter on remand to the District Court. 
LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, supra, was an 
equitable action, as is the case at bar, to enforce an alleged 
agreement to convey certain mining interests from the defendant 
to the plaintiff. The Court found that no findings of fact 
were made and vacated the judgment and remanded the case for 
a determination of facts on the material issues in dispute. 
The Court continued: 
Having concluded that it is necessary to 
remand this case for further proceedings, it is 
our duty to pass on matters which may then become 
material. [emphasis added.] 420 P.2d 615, 617. 
Rule 76(a), U.R.C.P. reads in part: 
The Supreme Court may reverse, affirm or 
modify any order or judgment appealed from 
If a new trial is granted, the Court shall pass 
12 
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upon and determine all questions of law involved 
in the case resented u on the a eal and necessar 
to the final determination of the case. emphasis 
added. 
One would gather, at least from the face of the opinion, 
that this Court in Silver Dollar Lounge v. Utah County Board 
of County Commissioners, ~- U.2d ~-' (No. 15653, January 4, 
1979), fully intended to vacate and remand and merely vacated 
the decision of the District Court inadvertently. 
Notwithstanding the above, in Doe v. Doe, 158 P. 781 
(Utah, 1916), the plaintiff brought an equitable action for 
divorce on the ground of cruelty. The District Court dismissed 
the complaint and plaintiff appealed. On appeal the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the findings of fact were wanting and 
revers~and remanded. The Court in Doe stated: 
We have, heretofore, many times referred to 
t e statute requiring specific and direct findings 
of ltimate facts on all the material issues and 
a separate statement of conclusions of law, and 
held that, until there are findings of all the 
material issues raised by the pleadings, the 
findings are insufficient to support the judgment 
We thus have a case where we are required to 
either remand it for specific findings on all the 
material issues, or ourselves try it de novo on the 
record and make our direct findings, before any 
question of law can be considered or any con~lusion 
reached either on the law or facts. [emphasis added.] 
158 P. at 783. 
Where inadequate findings of fact constitute the basis 
for reversal, an exhaustive search into Utah case law has 
13 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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failed to produce a single case wherein the Utah Supreme 
Court has merely vacated without remanding the case or de-
ciding the case on its merits de novo. 
Notwithstanding, it is the contention of the respondent 
Commission that the more appropriate remedy in the instant 
case, as it was in the case of LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. 
Peterson, supra, and cited by this Court in their majority 
opinion, is remand to the District Court for adequate findings 
of fact as to material issues rather than to vacate, and would 
request the Court to modify the disposition of the case 
accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
A rehearing should be granted and the judgment of 
this Court heretofore entered on January 4, 1979, should be 
vacated. The judgment of the trial Court should be affirmed, 
and the opinion of this Court should be modified to agree 
with the provisions of law and controlling authorities set 
out in this Petition for Rehearing and accompanying Brief 
of Authorities. In the alternative, this Court should at 
least remand for further findings or hearing to the trial 
Court to determine whether or not the appellant was afforded 
due process as claimed by petitioner. 
14 
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Respectfully submitted, 
G UR 
Depu y Utah Count Attorney 
Attorney for Respondents 
60 South University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to Matt Biljanic, Attorney for Appellant, 
7355 
this 
s:t~9th East, 
(day of 
Midvale, Utah 84047, postage prepaid, 
\ Jid'<df , 1979. 2 t!"1°1"es Se11~ 
~/~~ G>"~ ~ ) GuV"tl~NAM 
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